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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Medical residencies are a vital component of American 
medical education. McKeesport Hosp. v. ACGME, 24 F.3d 519, 
525 (3d Cir. 1994). They provide new doctors a supervised 
transition between the pure academics of medical school and the 
realities of practice. Generally they do so successfully: Our 
nation’s residency programs reliably produce some of the 
“finest physicians and medical researchers in the world.” 15 
U.S.C. § 37b(a)(1)(A). But as this case shows, these programs 
aren’t exempt from charges of sex discrimination. Here we must 
decide whether an ex-resident, proceeding anonymously as Jane 
Doe, can bring private causes of action for sex discrimination 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., against Mercy Catholic Medical Center, a 
private teaching hospital operating a residency program. The 
District Court held she cannot and dismissed her complaint in its 
entirety. We will affirm in part and reverse in part that order. 
Doe’s Title IX retaliation and quid pro quo claims endure. Her 
Title IX hostile environment claim is, however, time-barred. 
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I 
We recount the facts as Doe alleged them, accepting 
them as true. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 338 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2016); see App. 100–24. 
Graduate medical education, or residency education, is a 
period of didactic and clinical instruction in a medical specialty 
during which physicians prepare for independent practice after 
graduating from medical school. Residency programs are 
typically accredited. Leading on that front is the Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education, or ACGME, which 
aims to improve healthcare by assessing and advancing the 
quality of residents’ educations. Its reach is far and its influence 
wide. During the 2013–14 academic year, around 9,600 
ACGME-accredited programs operated in about 700 
institutions, enrolling over 120,000 residents and fellows in 130 
medical specialties. The ACGME calls these programs 
structured educational experiences, and completing one 
generally results in eligibility for board certification.  
Predictably, residency programs are expensive to run. 
The Association of American Medical Colleges says it costs a 
hospital about $152,000 a year to train a single resident. But the 
federal government helps with funding by way of direct and 
indirect graduate medical education payments through 
Medicare.  
Our case is about a residency program at Mercy, a 
private teaching hospital in Philadelphia that accepts Medicare 
payments and is affiliated with Drexel University’s College of 
Medicine. Owing to its commitment to medical education, 
Mercy offers four ACGME-accredited residency programs in 
internal medicine, diagnostic radiology, general surgery, and a 
transitional year residency, in addition to providing the clinical 
bases for Drexel Medicine’s emergency medicine residency. 
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Under a residency agreement, Doe joined Mercy’s 
diagnostic radiology residency program in 2011 as a second-
year, or R2. The program offered training in all radiology 
subspecialties in a community-hospital setting combining 
hands-on experience with didactic teaching. As required, Doe 
attended daily morning lectures presented by faculty and 
afternoon case presentations given by residents under faculty or 
attending physicians’ supervision. She took a mandatory physics 
class taught on Drexel’s campus, attended monthly radiology 
lectures and society meetings, joined in interdepartmental 
conferences, and sat for annual examinations to assess her 
progress and competence. 
Doe says the director of Mercy’s residency program, 
whom she calls Dr. James Roe, sexually harassed her and 
retaliated against her for complaining about his behavior, 
resulting in her eventual dismissal. Early on, Dr. Roe inquired 
about her personal life and learned she was living apart from her 
husband. He found opportunities to see and speak with her more 
than would otherwise be expected, often looking at her 
suggestively. This made Doe uncomfortable, especially when 
the two were alone. From these interactions she surmised Dr. 
Roe was sexually attracted to her and wished to pursue a 
relationship, though they both were married.  
Three months into her residency Doe sent Dr. Roe an 
email voicing concern that others knew about his interest in her. 
She wanted their relationship to remain professional, she said, 
but Dr. Roe persisted, stating he wanted to meet with her while 
they attended a conference in Chicago. She replied with text 
messages to clear the air that she didn’t want to pursue a 
relationship with him. Apparently displeased, Dr. Roe reported 
these messages to Mercy’s human resources department, or HR. 
In response, HR called Doe to a meeting where she described 
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Dr. Roe’s conduct, like how he’d touched her hand at work, and 
said his unwelcome sexual attention was negatively affecting 
her training. The next day HR referred Doe to a psychiatrist, 
noting that her attendance was optional. Doe, however, believed 
Mercy would use it against her if she didn’t go, given her 
complaints against Dr. Roe. She thus attended three sessions 
and complained there about Dr. Roe’s conduct, but she heard 
nothing more from HR. Later Dr. Roe apologized to Doe for 
reporting her. He did it, he said, for fear he’d be reprimanded 
for having an inappropriate relationship with her. Thereafter two 
male faculty members, both close with Dr. Roe, trained her 
significantly less than they had before.   
In Fall 2012 Dr. Roe learned Doe was getting divorced.  
His overtures intensified.  He too was getting divorced, he told 
her, and he wanted a relationship with her. He suggested they go 
shooting and travel together. He said he was uncomfortable with 
her going to dinner for fellowship interviews and unhappy about 
her leaving Philadelphia post-residency. During this time Doe 
asked Dr. Roe and another faculty member for fellowship 
recommendation letters. They agreed but wrote short, cursory, 
and perfunctory ones. Dr. Roe even told the fellowship’s 
director that Doe was a poor candidate. When Doe called Dr. 
Roe to ask why, he said it was to teach her a lesson before 
hanging up on her.   
In response to Doe’s complaints about Dr. Roe, Mercy’s 
vice president, Dr. Arnold Eiser, called Doe to a meeting with 
Dr. Roe and others. There Doe complained about Dr. Roe’s 
conduct again but was told to wait outside. A short time later 
Dr. Eiser escorted her to Mercy’s psychiatrist. As they walked 
Dr. Eiser told Doe her second in-service examination score was 
poor, an issue she needed to address. Later, however, Doe 
learned this wasn’t true: Her score was in the 70th percentile, 
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and Dr. Eiser had received misinformation. She asked Dr. Roe 
to report her improvement to the fellowship she’d applied to, 
but he refused. Mercy later told Doe that to remain in the 
program, she’d have to agree to a corrective plan.  Reluctantly, 
she signed on. 
Dr. Roe’s conduct continued into Spring 2013. Once 
while Doe was sitting alone with Dr. Roe at a computer 
reviewing radiology reports, he reached across her body and 
placed his hand on hers to control the mouse, pressing his arm 
against her breasts in the process. She pushed herself back in her 
chair, stood up, and protested. Another time, when a physician 
expressed interest in Doe, Dr. Roe became jealous and told Doe 
she shouldn’t date him. Later, in April 2013 Dr. Roe told 
another resident to remove Doe’s name as coauthor from a 
research paper she’d contributed to. Doe complained, but Dr. 
Roe said she was acting unprofessionally and ordered her to 
another meeting with Dr. Eiser. At that meeting Doe again told 
Dr. Eiser about Dr. Roe’s conduct over the past year. Dr. Eiser, 
however, said the other residents loved Dr. Roe and told her to 
apologize to him. She did, but Dr. Roe wouldn’t accept it, 
calling it insincere. Dr. Eiser suspended Doe, recommending 
another visit to the psychiatrist.  
Thereafter on April 20, 2013 Doe received a letter from 
Mercy stating she’d been terminated but could appeal. She 
appeared before an appeals committee four days later where she 
described Dr. Roe’s behavior. Dr. Roe appeared there too 
advocating for her dismissal. He did so, she says, because she’d 
rejected his advances. The committee upheld Doe’s dismissal, 
giving her five days to bring another appeal. She declined and 
quit the program, with Mercy accepting her resignation. Since 
then, no other residency program has accepted her, blocking her 
from full licensure. 
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* * * 
Doe sued Mercy in the District Court on April 20, 2015, 
exactly two years after she learned she’d been dismissed. 
Seeking damages and equitable relief, she alleges six claims, 
three under Title IX — retaliation, quid pro quo, and hostile 
environment — and three under Pennsylvania law — contract-
based sex discrimination, wrongful termination, and breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She concedes she 
never filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, or EEOC, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  
Ultimately the District Court dismissed the third iteration 
of Doe’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). Title IX doesn’t apply to Mercy, the court held, 
because it’s not an “education program or activity” under 20 
U.S.C. § 1681(a). Even if Title IX did apply, it stated, Doe can’t 
use Title IX to “circumvent” Title VII’s administrative 
requirements, as Congress intended Title VII as the “exclusive 
avenue for relief” for employment discrimination. 158 F. Supp. 
3d 256, 261 (E.D. Pa. 2016). The court also found Doe’s hostile 
environment claim untimely. Having dismissed all Doe’s Title 
IX claims, the court declined jurisdiction of her state law claims. 
Doe timely appealed.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367(a), and we have it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
exercise plenary review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, In re 
Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 
131 (3d Cir. 2016), affirming if the plaintiff failed to allege 
plausible claims, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 
(2009). 
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III 
Our analysis is threefold. We address whether Title IX 
applies to Mercy, whether Doe’s private causes of action are 
cognizable under Title IX, and what to do about Doe’s state law 
claims.  Title IX’s applicability to Mercy is first.  
A 
We start, of course, with Title IX’s language, North 
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520 (1982), 
which says, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 20 
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis added). We must decide, then, if 
Mercy’s operation of a residency program makes it an 
“education program or activity” under Title IX.  
We note this question of first impression reaches far 
beyond one ex-resident’s private lawsuit. It touches on the 
Executive’s very power to address gender discrimination in 
residency programs under existing federal law. Congress 
enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause powers, making it in 
the nature of a contract: In accepting federal funds, States agree 
to comply with its mandate. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of 
Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2005). Given its origins, Title 
IX’s only (express) enforcement mechanism is through 
agencies’ regulation of federal funding. Congress directs 
agencies to effectuate § 1681(a) by, among other means, the 
“termination of or refusal to grant or to continue” funding to 
education programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1682; see Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009). Today this 
directive applies afar: Twenty-one federal agencies currently 
enforce Title IX. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in 
Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial 
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Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,858 (Aug. 30, 2000) [hereinafter 
Title IX Common Rule] (codified in various sections of the 
Code of Federal Regulations). And no other federal statute 
empowers agencies to restrict funding from education programs 
engaging in sex discrimination. Title VI bars only race, color, 
and national origin discrimination, not sex discrimination. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d; see Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 
U.S. 274, 286 (1998). Title VII is rooted in the Commerce 
Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Spending 
Clause. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Gebser, 524 U.S. 
at 286–87. And only a “citizen of the United States” or “person 
within the jurisdiction thereof” can sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for unconstitutional sex discrimination in education programs. 
See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252, 255–56. Mindful of Title IX’s 
place in this intricate scheme, we tread carefully. 
* * * 
To resolve whether Mercy’s residency program makes it 
an “education program or activity,” we must square Title IX’s 
definition of a “program or activity,” codified at 20 U.S.C. § 
1687, with § 1681(a)’s language “education program or 
activity.” This requires a brief look at Title IX’s history.  
Patterned after Title VI, Title IX was enacted through the 
Education Amendments of 1972 in which Congress set out § 
1681(a)’s “education program or activity” language. In Grove 
City College v. Bell, however, the Supreme Court read that 
phrase narrowly, holding that the receipt of federal funds by a 
particular program within an institution “does not trigger 
institutionwide coverage” under Title IX. 465 U.S. 555, 573 
(1984). Congress disagreed. Overruling Grove City College it 
passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, or CRRA, to 
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define the phrase “program or activity” broadly in provisions of 
four civil rights statutes — Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a; the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b); the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6107(4); and Title IX, 20 
U.S.C. § 1687. See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 465–66 & n.3 
(1999).  
As amended by the CRRA, Title IX now says in § 1687 
that “program or activity” means “all of the operations” of the 
following kinds of entities, “any part of which” is extended 
federal funding: 
 state or local government instrumentalities, 20 U.S.C. § 
1687(1); 
 colleges, universities, postsecondary institutions, public 
systems of higher education, local educational agencies, 
vocational education systems, and “other” school 
systems, id. § 1687(2);  
 “entire” corporations, partnerships, “other” private 
organizations, and sole proprietorships if assistance is 
extended to them “as a whole” or they’re “principally 
engaged in the business of providing education, health 
care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation,” 
id. § 1687(3)(A); 
 “entire” plants or other “comparable, geographically 
separate” facilities in the case of “any other” 
corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole 
proprietorship not described in subsection (3)(A), id. § 
1687(3)(B); and 
 “any other entity” established by “two or more” entities 
described in subsections (1) through (3), id. § 1687(4). 
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In enacting § 1687, however, Congress retained in § 
1681(a) the modifier “education” before “program or activity.” 
It left “education” undefined and gave no guidance to reconcile 
§ 1687’s broad phrase “program or activity” with § 1681(a)’s 
ostensibly narrower language. Case law is scant on the issue. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed it.  Nor have we.  
Down this unmarked path we must now travel.  
How did the District Court navigate it?  It focused on the 
fact that in enacting the CRRA, Congress kept the word 
“education” in § 1681(a). That, combined with § 1681(c) — 
which defines an “educational institution” in part as “any public 
or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any 
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education” — 
“clearly” contemplated cabining Title IX to education programs 
“in the sense of schooling.” 158 F. Supp. 3d at 260. Title IX 
thus couldn’t apply to Mercy, it held, as residents already have a 
degree, don’t pay tuition, and are paid for their services and 
protected by labor laws. 
Respectfully, we find this approach wanting. Sections 
1681(a) and 1682 extend Title IX to “education programs or 
activities,” not to the “educational institutions” of § 1681(c). 
Where Congress used specific language in one part of a statute 
but different language in another, we presume different 
meanings were intended. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 711 n.9 (2004). That’s especially so here, where Congress 
used “educational institution” only in provisions to describe 
where Title IX doesn’t control. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(1)–
(5), (7)–(8), 1681(b), 1686; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175 (Section 
1681(a)’s subsections are “specific, narrow exceptions” to Title 
IX.); North Haven, 456 U.S. at 514 & n.1 (same). We also 
query: If Congress intended to limit education programs or 
activities only to educational institutions “in the sense of 
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schooling,” why did it enact detailed provisions expressly 
exempting noneducational institutions — like social fraternities, 
the YMCA, and the Girl Scouts — from Title IX’s reach? See, 
e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6). Those organizations would have 
already been impliedly exempt from Title IX, rendering 
superfluous § 1681(a)’s express exemptions for them. Because 
we strive to avoid superfluity in construing statutes, see Corley 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009), we reject this 
reading of Title IX.  
What direction does Mercy suggest we take? Tacitly 
conceding that § 1681(c) isn’t the way, they abandon it for § 
1687(3)(A)(ii). That provision says “program or activity” means 
all the operations of a private entity “principally engaged in the 
business of providing education, health care, housing, social 
services, or parks and recreation.” But because § 1681(a) says 
“education program or activity,” Mercy tells us we’re to ignore 
the words “health care, housing, social services, or parks and 
recreation” and hold that Title IX applies only to private entities 
“principally engaged in the business of providing education.” 
Applying that reading, Mercy deems the result inevitable: A 
private hospital like Mercy that employs physicians in its own 
residency program is “quite plainly” not principally engaged in 
the education business. Mercy Br. 8–9. 
If only it were so plain. Yet no part of Title IX says it 
reaches only entities “principally engaged in the business of 
providing education.”  Quite the opposite.  Section 1687 leaves 
space aplenty for a variety of entities irrespective of what 
they’re “principally” engaged in — for example, state and local 
government instrumentalities, private entities extended 
assistance as a whole, other private entities’ entire plants or 
separate facilities, and any entity established by two or more 
covered entities. More important, Mercy’s approach strikes out 
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considerable portions of § 1687(3)(A)(ii)’s text. Doe’s helpful 
visual aid puts that much on display: Mercy suggests Title IX 
applies only to private entities “principally engaged in the 
business of providing education, health care, housing, social 
services, or parks and recreation.” Reply Br. 8 (strikethrough in 
original). By that reading we cannot abide, for it violates a 
“most basic” interpretive rule that a statute is to be construed so 
that effect is given to all its provisions, so no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. Corley, 556 
U.S. at 314. 
It is then Doe who, we think, charts the soundest course.  
She says, and we agree, there’s no reason to read the phrase 
“education program or activity” so narrowly. The Supreme 
Court has twice instructed us that, to give Title IX the scope its 
origins dictate, we’re to accord it a sweep as broad as its 
language. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 521; see Jackson, 544 U.S. 
at 175. And indeed the ordinary meaning of “education” — a 
word Congress has yet to define — is “very broad.” Roubideaux 
v. North Dakota Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 977 
(8th Cir. 2009). Congress expressly exempted specific kinds of 
programs from Title IX’s reach — like military academies, 
religious schools, and sororities, see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)–(9) 
— so we’re hesitant to impose further restrictions without 
strong justifications from Title IX’s text. See North Haven, 456 
U.S. at 521–22 (The “absence of a specific” proffered exclusion 
from § 1681(a)’s exceptions “tends to support” that it shouldn’t 
be inferred.); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 
1994) (Because § 1681(a) lists specific exemptions, others are 
not to be “judicially implied.”). The statute offers no such 
justification, so we reconcile § 1687 with § 1681(a) as follows.  
Like the Second Circuit we hold that a “program or 
activity” under § 1687 is an “education program or activity” 
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under § 1681(a) if it has “features such that one could 
reasonably consider its mission to be, at least in part, 
educational.” O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 
1997). This accords with Title IX’s text and structure. It lines up 
with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ applications of Title IX 
beyond educational institutions “in the sense of schooling” to 
entire state-prison systems offering inmates educational 
programs. See Klinger v. Dep’t of Corrs., 107 F.3d 609, 613–16 
& n.5 (8th Cir. 1997); Roubideaux, 570 F.3d at 976–79; 
Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1224–25. It’s consistent with the First 
Circuit’s application of Title IX to a university’s medical 
residency program. See Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 
881 (1st Cir. 1988). And it’s in step with how twenty-one 
federal agencies, including the Departments of Education and 
Health and Human Services, have interpreted the statute. See 34 
C.F.R. § 106.1; 45 C.F.R. § 86.1; Title IX Common Rule, 
supra, at 52,865 (all saying Title IX applies to “any” education 
program or activity “whether or not” it’s “offered or sponsored 
by an educational institution”); U.S. Amicus Br. 18–19 n.7.  We 
adopt it.  
We recognize, however, that creative minds could 
conceivably read the word “education” in Title IX to 
“encompass every experience of life,” Roubideaux, 570 F.3d at 
977, transforming Title IX into a remedy for any dispute in 
which someone is “potentially” learning something, Doe, 158 F. 
Supp. 3d at 260. We see no sign Congress intended as much. 
Indeed by merely including the word “education” in § 1681(a), 
Congress signified that Title IX has some boundary. We 
endeavor here to delimit it. 
We note first that Title IX’s application turns primarily 
on whether the defendant-entity’s questioned program or 
activity has educational characteristics. The plaintiff’s 
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characteristics — for example, whether she’s a student, 
employee, or something else — may be relevant in some cases, 
but they aren’t necessarily dispositive. That caveat aside, we 
highlight here several features that support deeming a “program 
or activity” an “education program or activity” under Title IX, 
emphasizing that particular features (or other features not here 
listed) may be more or less relevant depending on the unique 
circumstances of each case. In no particular order, these features 
are that (A) a program is incrementally structured through a 
particular course of study or training, whether full- or part-time; 
(B) a program allows participants to earn a degree or diploma, 
qualify for a certification or certification examination, or pursue 
a specific occupation or trade beyond mere on-the-job training; 
(C) a program provides instructors, examinations, an evaluation 
process or grades, or accepts tuition; or (D) the entities offering, 
accrediting, or otherwise regulating a program hold it out as 
educational in nature. Accord O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 117–18 
(Education programs “typically provide instructors, evaluations, 
and offer a particular course of training.”). These guidelines are, 
we think, in keeping with the common understanding of the 
word “education” prevalent when Title IX was enacted. See, 
e.g., Webster’s New World Dictionary 444 (2d ed. 1970) 
(Education is the “process of training and developing the 
knowledge, skill, mind, character, etc., esp. by formal 
schooling; teaching; training.”); Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, 
Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012) (“When a term goes 
undefined in a statute,” we give it its “ordinary meaning.”).  
We end with this: Whether a program or activity is 
sufficiently educational under Title IX is a mixed question of 
law and fact. When the facts are uncontested, the judge decides 
the matter. Factual disputes material to her legal conclusion are, 
however, left for the finder of fact.   
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* * * 
Applying this reading, we identify two plausible ways 
Mercy’s residency program makes it an “education program or 
activity” under Title IX.  
First Doe’s allegations raise the plausible inference that 
Mercy is a private organization principally engaged in the 
business of providing healthcare, 20 U.S.C. § 1687(3)(A)(ii), 
whose operation of an ACGME-accredited residency program 
makes its mission, at least in part, educational, see O’Connor, 
126 F.3d at 117; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Doe says, and we accept 
as true, that she was enrolled in a multiyear regulated program 
of study and training in diagnostic radiology at Mercy. That 
program required her to learn and train under faculty members 
and physicians, attend lectures and help present case 
presentations under supervision, participate in a physics class on 
a university campus, and sit for annual examinations. Had Doe 
completed Mercy’s program, she would have been eligible to 
take the American Board of Radiology’s certification 
examinations, and passing scores there would have certified her 
to practice for six years. Doe also says Mercy held out its 
residency programs as educational in nature and that the 
ACGME calls residency programs “structured educational 
experience[s].” App. 103. These allegations, we think, satisfy 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–
80. Courts have repeatedly recognized the educational qualities 
of residency programs in other contexts, even where ultimately 
deeming residents nonstudents. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. 
Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 47 (2011) 
(“Most doctors who graduate from medical school” pursue 
“additional education in a specialty to become board certified to 
practice in that field.”); id. at 60 (Residents are “engaged in a 
valuable educational pursuit” and are “students of their craft.”); 
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Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 507 (1994) 
(Because residents “learn both by treating patients and by 
observing other physicians do so,” graduate medical education 
programs “take place in a patient care unit (most often in a 
teaching hospital), rather than in a classroom.”); McKeesport 
Hosp., 24 F.3d at 525 (Residencies are a “vital component” of 
“medical education.”); Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 
1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 1996) (Residencies combine “features of 
both employment and academic study.”); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 
897 (A resident is “both an employee and a student.”). So too 
has Congress. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(1)(B)(i) (A 
“graduate medical education program” is a “residency program” 
for “medical education and training.”). 
We hasten to note, however, that our assessment of the 
educational features of Mercy’s residency program does not 
imply that one must perform a program-specific analysis on 
each and every prerequisite to Title IX coverage. For instance, 
whether a covered program or activity receives “Federal 
financial assistance,” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), is determined by 
reference to the “entire” entity or “whole” organization, id. § 
1687. Congress made that clear in overruling Grove City 
College, 465 U.S. 555. See S. Rep. No. 100-64, at 4 (1987). 
With respect to “Federal financial assistance” for purposes of 
Title IX coverage, our analysis here does not alter the 
requirement of an institution-wide assessment. 
Second we find it plausible Mercy’s operation of a 
residency program makes its mission, at least in part, 
educational under Title IX because of Mercy’s “affiliat[ion]” 
with Drexel Medicine, App. 104, a university program plausibly 
covered by Title IX, see 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A). Two decisions 
guide us — Lam v. Curators of UMKC Dental School, 122 F.3d 
654 (8th Cir. 1997), and O’Connor from the Second Circuit. 
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In Lam a clinician hired a university dental student to 
work at his private office “[un]affiliated” with the university. 
122 F.3d at 655. Alleging the clinician sexually assaulted her 
there, the student sued the university under Title IX. The 
university argued that she failed to show a “nexus” between the 
private office and the university, id. at 656, and the Eighth 
Circuit agreed, holding that the “independent, private dental 
practice” wasn’t a “program or activity of the University” under 
Title IX. Id. An education program, the court explained, is one 
“controlled by” and that inures “some benefit” to the covered 
institution. Id. In the student’s case, it found, the clinician 
conferred “no benefit” to the university by operating a 
“separate, competing” clinic, as the university exercised “no 
control” over it and didn’t provide it “staff, funding,” or “any 
other support.” Id.  
Similarly in O’Connor a college arranged for its student 
to serve as an unpaid intern at a hospital. 126 F.3d at 113. 
Alleging she was sexually harassed there, the intern sued the 
college and hospital under Title IX, but the college was 
dismissed from the case. The intern argued that Title IX reached 
the hospital because it accepted interns and thus operated a 
vocational training program. Id. at 116. Framing the issue as 
whether Title IX applied to a hospital that allowed students to 
volunteer from a college with which it had “no affiliation,” the 
Second Circuit disagreed. Id. at 117. The hospital, it found, 
maintained “none of the characteristics associated with being an 
educator,” unlike, for example, a “teaching hospital’s ‘mixed 
employment-training context.’” Id. at 118 (quoting Lipsett, 864 
F.2d at 897). And the college’s status as an education program 
couldn’t be “imputed” to the hospital, it held, because there was 
no evidence of an “institutional affiliation,” a “written 
agreement binding” them, shared staff, or funds “circulated 
between them.” Id. 
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Our case is different. Unlike Lam where the private 
dental office was “[un]affiliated” with the university, 122 F.3d 
at 655, here we accept as true that Mercy’s residency program is 
“affiliated” with Drexel Medicine, App. 104. Doe supports that 
contention with allegations that she took a physics class “taught 
on Drexel’s campus,” App. 106, and that Mercy provided the 
“clinical bases” for Drexel Medicine’s emergency medicine 
residency, App. 104. It’s thus plausible, we think, that Mercy’s 
residency program inured “some benefit” to Drexel Medicine 
(and vice versa) and that these entities shared “staff, funding,” 
and “other support.” Lam, 122 F.3d at 656; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 679 (Rule 8’s inquiry is a “context-specific task” requiring us 
to draw on our “judicial experience and common sense.”).  
O’Connor is distinguishable too. There the hospital 
accepted student-interns from a college with which it had “no 
institutional affiliation.” 126 F.3d at 118. Here, in contrast, Doe 
expressly alleges such an affiliation between Mercy and Drexel 
Medicine. And given her supporting allegations, we find it 
plausible to infer an “agreement binding” them and the sharing 
of “staff” and “funds.” Id. Given these alleged connections, it’s 
plausible Mercy’s operation of a residency program affiliated 
with Drexel Medicine makes its mission, at least in part, 
educational under Title IX, satisfying § 1681(a). We will 
therefore vacate the District Court’s order so far as it concludes 
otherwise. 
* * * 
 Of our first inquiry just one matter remains.  In a lengthy 
footnote Mercy claims it doesn’t receive “Federal financial 
assistance” under Title IX because its Medicare payments stem 
from “contracts of insurance.” Mercy Br. 7–8 n.2. Mercy, 
however, made no such argument in the District Court. Our rule 
is well established in that circumstance: Theories not raised 
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squarely there cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal. 
Lesende v. Borrero, 752 F.3d 324, 333 (3d Cir. 2014); see 
United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 338–42 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Seeing no reason to depart from this rule (Mercy offers none), 
we decline to consider this argument, particularly as “contracts 
of insurance” in federal civil rights statutes intend to refer to 
contracts in the traditional sense, like those involving 
“individual bank accounts in a bank with federally guaranteed 
deposits.” United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 
1039, 1048 (5th Cir. 1984). We thus assume without deciding 
that Mercy receives “Federal financial assistance” under Title 
IX, leaving it for the District Court to address on remand.  
B 
We continue to our second inquiry — whether Doe’s 
private causes of action are cognizable under Title IX. As we 
said above, Title IX provides just one express enforcement 
mechanism: action through federal agencies. See 20 U.S.C. § 
1682. But in Cannon v. University of Chicago the Supreme 
Court held that Title IX implies a cause of action for private 
litigants. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). We must decide, therefore, 
if Cannon extends to Doe’s Title IX retaliation, quid pro quo, 
and hostile environment claims.  
Mercy says, and the District Court agreed, a roadblock 
stands in Doe’s way — Title VII.  Residents are employees, 
Mercy submits, and Title VII governs employment 
relationships, prohibiting discrimination based on sex. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a); Covington v. Int’l Assoc. 
of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118–19 (3d Cir. 
2013). But, Mercy notes, Title VII also sets out elaborate 
administrative requirements an employee must satisfy before 
seeking relief in court. See Burgh v. Borough Council of 
Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469–71 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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Title IX is, in contrast, bare. While it requires proof an 
appropriate person had notice of the alleged discrimination so 
the institution had an opportunity to address it, see 20 U.S.C. § 
1682; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290, Title 
IX doesn’t have administrative hurdles like Title VII. This 
means Title IX plaintiffs can “file directly in court” under 
Cannon’s implied cause of action. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255. 
Given Title VII’s carefully-drawn framework, Mercy contends, 
the District Court was right that Congress intended Title VII as 
the sole avenue of private relief for employees of federally-
funded education programs who allege sex discrimination. 
Private Title IX claims alleging the same conduct, Mercy 
argues, are not cognizable because they’d allow education-
program employees to plead their way round Title VII’s 
administrative scheme.  
We agree with just one part of this assessment.  While we 
won’t (and can’t) speak for all residents, we agree here it’s 
plausible Doe was Mercy’s “employee” notwithstanding any 
other status the law may or may not have reposed on her (for 
example, a “student”). We rely on Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), to decide if a person is an 
“employee” under Title VII, see Covington, 710 F.3d at 119. 
Applied to Doe’s complaint, Darden’s factors indeed suggest 
she was an employee under Title VII. See 503 U.S. at 323–24.  
For instance, Mercy was the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools of Doe’s work as a resident, the 
location of Doe’s work was at Mercy, and Mercy assigned Doe 
projects and tasks. See id. Doe had no discretion over when and 
how long she worked beyond ACGME guidelines limiting her 
workweek to 80 hours. See id. And assuming she was paid (a 
plausible assumption, we think), her paychecks were taxed like 
other employees under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 
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or FICA. See id.; see Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 47, 60. She had 
no apparent role in hiring or paying assistants, her work was 
part of Mercy’s regular business of providing healthcare to 
patients, and she could bargain collectively as a resident like 
other employees. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24; Boston Med. 
Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 168 (1999). In sum, we agree 
with Mercy that, had Doe complied with Title VII’s 
administrative requirements, she could have filed Title VII 
claims in court as an “employee” like other residents have 
before. See, e.g., Takele v. Mayo Clinic, 576 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 
2009). 
Nevertheless we reject the rest of Mercy’s argument.  
Title VII’s concurrent applicability does not bar Doe’s private 
causes of action for retaliation and quid pro quo harassment 
under Title IX.  Six Supreme Court decisions guide us.  
* * * 
First is Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 
U.S. 454 (1975), which involved whether the timely filing of an 
EEOC charge alleging race discrimination under Title VII tolled 
the limitations period on a claim alleging race discrimination 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a statute without administrative 
requirements. Though it ultimately found the latter claim 
untimely, the Court held that the “remedies available under Title 
VII and under § 1981, although related, and although directed to 
most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent.” 
Id. at 461. Despite Title VII’s “range” and “design as a 
comprehensive solution” for “invidious discrimination in 
employment,” the Court explained, a private-sector employee 
“clearly is not deprived of other remedies” and isn’t “limited to 
Title VII in his search for relief.” Id. at 459. Title VII “manifests 
a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue 
independently his rights under both Title VII and other 
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applicable” federal statutes. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974)). The employer argued that 
allowing Johnson’s § 1981 claim to proceed might permit his 
circumvention of Title VII’s administrative requirements, going 
against Congress’s intent. But the Court disagreed: 
Conciliation and persuasion through the [EEOC’s] 
administrative process [under Title VII], to be sure, 
often constitute a desirable approach to settlement of 
disputes based on sensitive and emotional charges of 
invidious employment discrimination. We recognize, 
too, that the filing of a lawsuit [under § 1981] might 
tend to deter efforts at conciliation, that lack of success 
in the legal action could weaken the [EEOC’s] efforts 
to induce voluntary compliance, and that a suit is 
privately oriented and narrow, rather than broad, in 
application, as successful conciliation tends to be. But 
these are the natural effects of the choice Congress has 
made available to the claimant by its conferring upon 
him independent administrative and judicial remedies. 
The choice is a valuable one. Under some 
circumstances, the administrative route may be highly 
preferred over the litigatory; under others the reverse 
may be true. 
Id. at 461 (emphasis added). The Court thus declined to infer 
any positive preference for Title VII without a more “definite” 
congressional expression. Id.  
A year later came Brown v. General Services 
Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), which involved an 
amendment to Title VII (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16) that waived 
sovereign immunity to grant federal employees access to 
administrative and judicial relief from workplace 
discrimination. Alleging race discrimination, an ex-GSA 
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employee filed claims under § 1981 and § 2000e-16, but the 
latter was untimely under the amendment’s jurisdictional 
limitations period. Holding that Congress intended § 2000e-16 
as the “exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial 
scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination,” 
425 U.S. at 829 (emphasis added), the Supreme Court affirmed 
dismissal of Brown’s case for want of jurisdiction. Critically, 
the Court distinguished Johnson as “inapposite,” for Johnson 
held only that Title VII doesn’t “pre-empt” other remedies in 
“private employment,” not federal employment. Id. at 833. 
Johnson’s inapplicability was especially plain, the Court found, 
because private employment doesn’t raise “problems of 
sovereign immunity.” Id.   
Then in 1979, seven years after Title IX’s enactment, the 
Court decided Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, in which an applicant 
sued a medical school alleging it denied her admission based on 
her sex, in violation of Title IX. The Seventh Circuit affirmed 
dismissal of her claim, holding that Congress intended Title 
IX’s administrative device as the “exclusive means” to enforce 
the statute. 441 U.S. at 683–84. The Supreme Court disagreed. 
Reading § 1681(a), it inferred a private cause of action for the 
applicant to allege the medical school “rejected her” based on 
sex, id. at 688–89, notwithstanding that Title IX doesn’t 
“expressly authorize” private action, id. at 683. Title IX 
“explicitly confers a benefit on persons discriminated against” 
based on sex, the Court held, and the plaintiff was “clearly a 
member of that class for whose special benefit the statute was 
enacted.” Id. at 694 (emphasis added).  
Three years later came North Haven, 456 U.S. 512, in 
which ex-school employees filed Title IX agency actions 
alleging sex discrimination against two school boards. Agencies 
had promulgated regulations interpreting Title IX to extend to 
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sex-based employment discrimination. See id. at 516 (citing, for 
example, 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a)(1)). The boards sued the 
agencies, seeking to declare these regulations ultra vires under 
Title IX. Voting six to three, the Supreme Court upheld them, as 
the agencies had fairly read § 1681(a)’s “broad directive that ‘no 
person’ may be discriminated against” based on sex to 
encompass “employees as well as students.” Id. at 520 
(emphasis added). The Court rejected the argument that Title IX 
shouldn’t extend to private employment because employees 
have “remedies other than those available under Title IX,” like 
Title VII. Id. at 535 n.26. Even if “alternative remedies are 
available and their existence is relevant,” it rejoined, “Congress 
has provided a variety of remedies, at times overlapping, to 
eradicate employment discrimination.” Id. (citing, among other 
decisions, Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459). 
Joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Powell dissented. Given Title VII’s “comprehensive” 
scheme and “carefully prescribed procedures” for EEOC 
conciliation, he would have held that Title IX doesn’t extend to 
private employment, as Title IX has “no time limits for action, 
no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to procedure.” Id. 
at 552 (Powell, J., dissenting). He also thought it “unlikely” 
Congress would “duplicate” enforcement of Titles VII and IX in 
private-sector employment by “different departments of 
government with different enforcement powers, areas of 
expertise, and enforcement methods.” Id. at 553. 
A decade later the Court decided Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), in which a student 
sought damages for sexual harassment under Title IX. 
Acknowledging Cannon’s implied cause of action and relying 
on the presumption that “all appropriate remedies” are available 
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for private litigants, id. at 66, the Court held that damages are 
available in private Title IX actions, id. at 76. 
Finally in 2005 the Court decided Jackson v. 
Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, in which a 
school board relieved a high school “employee” of his coaching 
position after he complained that the girls’ basketball team 
received unequal treatment based on sex. Id. at 171. He sued in 
his private capacity, bringing a Title IX retaliation claim. 
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Court allowed the 
employee’s retaliation claim to proceed under Cannon. Id. at 
173–74. If funding recipients were “permitted to retaliate 
freely,” the Court held, “individuals” who witness sex 
discrimination would be “loath to report it” and “all manner of 
Title IX violations might go unremedied.” Id. at 180. 
* * * 
From these six decisions we derive four guiding 
principles. First private-sector employees aren’t “limited to 
Title VII” in their search for relief from workplace 
discrimination. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459. The Supreme Court 
has so held despite Title VII’s “range” and “design as a 
comprehensive solution” for “invidious discrimination in 
employment.” Id.; see Brown, 425 U.S. at 833; North Haven, 
456 U.S. at 535 n.26. 
Second it is a matter of “policy” left for Congress’s 
constitutional purview whether an alternative avenue of relief 
from employment discrimination might undesirably allow 
circumvention of Title VII’s administrative requirements. North 
Haven, 456 U.S. at 535 n.26 (Concurrent enforcement was a 
“policy” consideration for Congress to weigh, and we cannot 
ignore Title IX’s language and history even if we disagree with 
that legislative choice.); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 461 (These are the 
“natural effects of the choice Congress has made available” to 
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an employee “by its conferring upon him independent 
administrative and judicial remedies.”). North Haven is 
particularly illuminating. Dissenting there, Justice Powell 
described vividly the putative inefficiencies, redundancies, and 
contradictions of parallel enforcement in private-sector 
employment under Titles VII and IX. 456 U.S. at 540–55 
(Powell, J., dissenting). But given Congress’s use of the 
expansive term “person” in § 1681(a), six Justices rejected those 
views, see id. at 514–40 & n.26 (majority opinion), signifying 
they carry little, if indeed any, weight in our analysis.   
Third the provision implying Title IX’s private cause of 
action, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), encompasses employees, not just 
students, see North Haven, 456 U.S. at 520 (Section 1681(a)’s 
“broad directive” that no “person” may be discriminated against 
based on sex encompasses “employees as well as students.”); 
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 (A private cause of action exists under 
Title IX for “persons” suffering sex discrimination.). Because § 
1681(a) “neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees 
from its reach,” we’re to interpret it as “covering and protecting 
these ‘persons,’” for Congress easily could have substituted 
“‘student’ or ‘beneficiary’ for the word ‘person’ if it had wished 
to restrict” § 1681(a)’s scope. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 521. 
 Fourth Title IX’s implied private cause of action extends 
explicitly to employees of federally-funded education programs 
who allege sex-based retaliation claims under Title IX. See 
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171. Retaliation against a “person,” 
including an employee, because she “complained of sex 
discrimination” is another form of “intentional sex 
discrimination” actionable under Title IX. Id. at 174. Mercy, for 
its part, urges a narrower reading of Jackson because, unlike 
Doe, the plaintiff there likely had no recourse under Title VII. 
But Jackson bears out no such qualification. Indeed Jackson 
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repeatedly underscores Title IX’s wide range. See, e.g., id. at 
171 (Title IX retaliation claims extend to “individual[s],” not 
individuals who can’t bring Title VII claims.); id. at 173 
(Section 1681(a) “broadly” encompasses “any person.”); id. at 
175 (Discrimination “covers a wide range of intentional unequal 
treatment; by using such a broad term, Congress gave the statute 
a broad reach.”); id. (Title IX is a “broadly written general 
prohibition on discrimination.”); id. at 179 & n.3 (Title IX is 
“broadly worded” and its “beneficiaries plainly include all 
those” subjected to sex discrimination); id. at 183 (The Court’s 
decisions since Cannon “consistently” have interpreted Title 
IX’s private cause of action “broadly” to encompass “diverse 
forms of intentional sex discrimination.”). And no subsequent 
decision has narrowed Jackson as Mercy so urges. See Gomez-
Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 483 (2008) (Jackson holds that a 
“private party,” not a private party who can’t proceed under 
Title VII, “may assert a retaliation claim under Title IX.”). This 
principle thus holds true.  
 We note the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held 
categorically that Title VII provides the “exclusive remedy for 
individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of 
sex in federally funded educational institutions.” Lakoski v. 
James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995); accord Waid v. Merrill 
Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 861–62 (7th Cir. 1996), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246. 
Allowing any private Title IX claim to proceed there, these 
courts held, would “disrupt” Title VII’s “carefully balanced 
remedial scheme for redressing employment discrimination.” 
Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754; see Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62. Given the 
four principles described above, we decline to follow Lakoski 
and Waid, both of which went against the First and Fourth 
Circuits’ decisions recognizing employees’ private Title IX 
claims. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 895–97; Preston v. Virginia ex 
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rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(Cannon extends to “employment discrimination on the basis of 
gender by educational institutions receiving federal funds.”); see 
also Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 131 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2013) (noting Lakoski’s split from Lipsett and Preston). More 
important, Lakoski and Waid did not address the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Johnson and Brown and the provisions of 
North Haven rejecting “policy”-based rationales like those 
Justice Powell set out in his dissent and that Mercy and its 
amicus raise here. Finally, Lakoski and Waid were decided a 
decade before the Supreme Court handed down Jackson, which 
explicitly recognized an employee’s private claim under 
Cannon. We thus question the continued viability of Lakoski 
and Waid and see fit here to deviate from them.   
 We now apply these principles to Doe’s Title IX claims.  
Retaliation   
 For reasons already explained, we confirm that a private 
retaliation claim exists for employees of federally-funded 
education programs under Title IX notwithstanding Title VII’s 
concurrent applicability. Jackson and the decisions before it 
make plain: When a funding recipient retaliates against a 
“person,” including an employee, because she complains of sex 
discrimination, that’s “intentional discrimination” based on sex, 
violative of Title IX and actionable under Cannon’s implied 
cause of action. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174; see North Haven, 456 
U.S. at 520. Whether that person could also proceed under Title 
VII is of no moment, for Congress provided a “variety of 
remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate” private-sector 
employment discrimination. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 535 n.26; 
see Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459; Brown, 425 U.S. at 833. It is thus 
Congress’s prerogative — not ours — to alter that course.  
 Without addressing Jackson or Doe’s factual allegations, 
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the District Court dismissed Doe’s retaliation claim as inviable 
under Title IX. Because we disagree, we will vacate that 
dismissal and remand this claim for consideration in the first 
instance. The following standards apply: Title VII’s familiar 
retaliation framework “generally governs” Title IX retaliation 
claims. Emeldi v. Univ. of Oregon, 698 F.3d 715, 723–25 & n.3 
(9th Cir. 2012). Our fellow Courts of Appeals have so held. See, 
e.g., Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 843, 
867–68 (9th Cir. 2014) (Under Title IX, speaking out against 
sex discrimination is “protected activity.”); Papelino v. Albany 
Coll. of Pharm. of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 91–92 (2d Cir. 
2011); Preston, 31 F.3d at 206–07. Accordingly, to establish a 
prima facie retaliation case under Title IX, Doe must prove she 
engaged in activity protected by Title IX, she suffered an 
adverse action, and there was a causal connection between the 
two. Cf. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340–42 
(3d Cir. 2006). If she makes this showing, the burden shifts to 
Mercy to advance a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its 
conduct. Id. at 342. If Mercy does so, Doe must show that 
Mercy’s proffered explanation was false and that retaliation was 
the real reason for the adverse action against her. Id. 
 Finally, Doe’s retaliation claim is timely under Title IX’s 
two-year limitations period only so far as she alleges retaliatory 
conduct that occurred on or after April 20, 2013, two years 
before she filed this lawsuit. See Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 
882 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1989) (For Title IX claims arising from 
actions occurring in Pennsylvania and involving Pennsylvania 
citizens, Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period “applicable 
to personal injury actions” controls.); Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002) (Retaliation is a 
discrete act.). We note that, as Doe’s complaint currently stands, 
only two incidents fit this temporal criteria — Mercy’s decision 
to dismiss her by letter dated April 20, 2013 and Dr. Roe’s 
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advocating for her dismissal at her appeal hearing on April 24, 
2013. 
Quid Pro Quo Harassment 
 We likewise hold that a private quid pro quo claim exists 
for employees of federally-funded education programs under 
Title IX notwithstanding Title VII’s concurrent applicability, for 
private-sector employees may pursue independently their rights 
under both Title VII and other applicable federal statutes. 
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459; see North Haven, 456 U.S. at 535 
n.26; Brown, 425 U.S. at 833. We decline here to infer any 
positive preference for Title VII without a more definite 
congressional expression — for example, a provision in Title 
VII barring concurrent private Title IX claims. Cf. Johnson, 421 
U.S. at 461. 
In so holding, we recognize that the Supreme Court has 
yet to extend Cannon to quid pro quo claims in the private 
employment setting. But to exclude them would, we think, 
ignore the import of the Court’s “repeated” holdings construing 
the word discrimination in Title IX broadly and deeming sexual 
harassment actionable under Cannon in other contexts. Jackson, 
544 U.S. at 174–75 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629, 643, 650 (1999); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91; 
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75). As Jackson admonished, the term 
“discrimination” in § 1681(a) covers a “wide range of 
intentional unequal treatment.” Id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
And quid pro quo sexual harassment — i.e., when tangible 
adverse action results from an underling’s refusal to submit to a 
higher-up’s sexual demands — is, by its very nature, intentional 
unequal treatment based on sex. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1998); see id. at 752 (Sex 
discrimination is “explicit” in a quid pro quo scenario.). 
 The Spending Clause’s notice requirements also pose no 
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obstacle to Title IX quid pro quo claims seeking damages in the 
employment setting. Given the Clause’s contractual nature, 
private Title IX damages actions are available only if the 
funding recipient had adequate notice it could be liable for the 
conduct alleged. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181; cf. id. at 181–84 
(Title IX retaliation claims meet this requirement.). But funding 
recipients have known they could be sued privately for 
intentional sex discrimination under Title IX “since 1979” when 
the Court decided Cannon. Id. at 182. And quid pro quo sexual 
harassment is, as we said above, intentional sex discrimination, 
whether it occurs in an education or employment setting. The 
First Circuit impliedly recognized as much in 1988 in allowing a 
medical resident’s quid pro quo claim to proceed under Title IX. 
See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898. And other courts have recognized 
Title IX quid pro quo claims in other contexts. See, e.g., 
Papelino, 633 F.3d at 89; Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 263 
F.3d 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2001). These decisions have, we think, 
adequately apprised covered entities of their potential liability 
for quid pro quo harassment in the employment setting, as the 
Spending Clause demands.  
 The District Court, of course, never got this far. It 
dismissed Doe’s quid pro quo claim as inviable under Title IX 
without considering her factual allegations. We thus treat this 
claim precisely the way we treated her retaliation claim: We will 
vacate its dismissal and remand it for consideration in the first 
instance. These standards apply: Like retaliation, Title VII’s 
quid pro quo framework generally governs Title IX claims 
alleging quid pro quo harassment. Our fellow Courts of Appeals 
have again held as much. See, e.g., Papelino, 633 F.3d at 88–90; 
Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898–89. Accordingly, unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical 
actions of a sexual nature constitute quid pro quo harassment 
when (A) the plaintiff’s submission to that conduct is made 
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either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of her 
education or employment experience in a federally-funded 
education program, or (B) submission to or rejection of that 
conduct is used as the basis for education or employment 
decisions that affect the plaintiff. Cf. Bonenberger v. Plymouth 
Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 27 (3d Cir. 1997). Given Title IX’s Spending 
Clause origins, a Title IX plaintiff seeking damages for quid pro 
quo harassment must also prove that an “official who at a 
minimum” had “authority to address the alleged discrimination 
and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf” 
had “actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s 
programs” and failed adequately to respond. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 
290; see Papelino, 633 F.3d at 88–89. A response is inadequate 
if the officer failed to provide one or if she provided one 
amounting to deliberate indifference to the discrimination 
alleged. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; see Papelino, 633 F.3d at 88–
89 (A recipient’s response to sex discrimination must be clearly 
unreasonable “in light of known circumstances.” (citing Davis, 
526 U.S. at 648)). 
 Finally, like her retaliation claim, Doe’s quid pro quo 
claim is timely only so far as she alleges conduct that occurred 
on or after April 20, 2013, two years before she sued Mercy. See 
Bougher, 882 F.2d at 78; Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 28 
(distinguishing discrete acts of quid pro quo harassment from 
acts aggregated to make out a hostile environment claim). And 
again, as Doe’s complaint currently stands, only her April 20, 
2013 dismissal and Dr. Roe’s appearance at her April 24, 2013 
appeal hearing meet this criteria.  
Hostile Environment 
 On Doe’s final Title IX claim — hostile environment — 
we need not decide whether Title VII’s applicability renders it 
inviable. Even if Title VII doesn’t preclude this claim, we agree 
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with the District Court that it’s time-barred. Doe concedes only 
two incidents occurred on or after April 20, 2013, within Title 
IX’s two-year limitations period — her April 20, 2013 dismissal 
and Dr. Roe’s appearance at her April 24, 2013 appeal hearing. 
She says these incidents invoke the continuing-violation 
doctrine recognized under Title VII.  We hold otherwise.   
 Under that doctrine, discriminatory acts that aren’t 
individually actionable may be aggregated to make out a Title 
VII hostile environment claim. Mandel v. M & Q Packaging 
Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013). These acts can occur at 
any time if they’re linked in a pattern of actions continuing into 
Title VII’s limitations period. Id. All the alleged acts, however, 
must be part of the same unlawful employment practice, id. at 
165–66, meaning they involved “similar conduct by the same 
individuals, suggesting a persistent, ongoing pattern,” id. at 167. 
It’s an open question in our Court whether this doctrine applies 
under Title IX. Some courts suggest it does. See, e.g., Stanley v. 
Trs. of California State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 
2006). Others suggest it doesn’t. See, e.g., Folkes v. New York 
Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 214 F. Supp. 2d 273, 288–91 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002). But we need not decide this question today. 
Even were we to apply the doctrine to Doe’s Title IX hostile 
environment claim, the two timely incidents she points to 
wouldn’t invoke it.  
Concerning Doe’s April 20, 2013 dismissal, Mercy’s 
decision to dismiss her was a discrete act actionable on its own 
as retaliation or quid pro quo harassment. It cannot 
simultaneously support a hostile environment claim. See 
Mandel, 706 F.3d at 165 (Discrete acts are not actionable if 
time-barred even when related to timely acts. (citing Morgan, 
536 U.S. at 113)). Concerning her April 24, 2013 appeal 
hearing, Doe alleges only that Dr. Roe “advocated” for her 
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dismissal there. App. 115. She doesn’t allege, as the District 
Court noted, that he made sexualized comments or touched her 
in a sexual way there. Dr. Roe’s conduct at the hearing, 
therefore, wasn’t sufficiently similar to his pre-April 20, 2013 
conduct to plausibly invoke the continuing-violation doctrine, 
assuming we’d apply it here. Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167. 
Accordingly, this claim is time-barred and we will affirm its 
dismissal.    
C 
We come to our final inquiry — what to do about Doe’s 
state law claims. The District Court declined supplemental 
jurisdiction of them after dismissing her Title IX claims. A court 
may do so under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) when it dismisses all 
claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Elkadrawy v. 
Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009). But we 
hold that Doe’s Title IX retaliation and quid pro quo claims 
endure. We will therefore reverse dismissal of her state law 
claims and remand them for consideration in the first instance. 
IV 
 For the reasons above, we will affirm in part and reverse 
in part the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
